Agent token auth performed O(n) PBKDF2 operations per request with no
rate limiting, enabling CPU exhaustion attacks. Webhook ingest had no
rate limits either. Add an in-memory token-bucket rate limiter:
- Agent auth: 20 requests/minute per IP
- Webhook ingest: 60 requests/minute per IP
Includes unit tests for the rate limiter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The first 6 characters of invalid agent tokens were logged, leaking
partial credential information. Remove token_prefix from log messages
while preserving the request path for debugging.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The optional variant of get_agent_auth_context had accept_authorization=False,
which prevented agents using Authorization: Bearer from passing through the
ACTOR_DEP / BOARD_READ_DEP / TASK_DEP dependency chain.
This caused 401 on any agent route that resolves a board or task via the shared
ACTOR_DEP (e.g. PATCH /agent/boards/{id}/tasks/{id} and
POST /agent/boards/{id}/tasks/{id}/comments), even though the same token worked
fine on routes that use AGENT_CTX_DEP directly (accept_authorization=True).
Fix: set accept_authorization=True in get_agent_auth_context_optional so both
X-Agent-Token and Authorization: Bearer are accepted consistently.
Verified: PATCH and POST /comments now resolve board/task correctly when
Authorization: Bearer is used. No security regression — agent_token_hash
comparison rejects any non-agent bearer tokens.
