Replace sync redis.Redis with redis.asyncio to avoid blocking the
event loop during rate-limit checks. Make RateLimiter.is_allowed async
across both backends and update all call sites to await.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add get_client_ip() helper that inspects Forwarded and X-Forwarded-For
headers only when the direct peer is in TRUSTED_PROXIES (comma-separated
IPs/CIDRs). Replaces raw request.client.host in rate-limit and webhook
source_ip to prevent all traffic collapsing behind a reverse proxy IP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Not all webhook providers use X-Hub-Signature-256 or X-Webhook-Signature.
Add an optional signature_header field so users can specify which header
carries the HMAC signature. When set, that exact header is checked;
when unset, the existing auto-detect fallback is preserved. The custom
header is also excluded from stored/exposed payload headers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Move blank/whitespace-only secret normalization to a shared
field_validator on both BoardWebhookCreate and BoardWebhookUpdate.
This ensures consistent behavior across create and update paths
and removes the inline normalization from the endpoint handlers.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add WEBHOOK_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES setting (default 1 MB) so deployments
with larger webhook payloads can raise the limit via environment
variable instead of being hard-blocked at 1 MB.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
_captured_headers was storing all x-* headers including
X-Hub-Signature-256 and X-Webhook-Signature. Since stored headers
are exposed via the payload read endpoint, this enabled replay
attacks without knowing the webhook secret. Now signature and
authorization headers are excluded from capture.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The secret field was accepted in BoardWebhookCreate but never passed
to the BoardWebhook constructor, silently dropping it. Now secret is
persisted at creation time (with empty/whitespace normalized to None)
and similarly normalized on PATCH so sending "" clears a set secret.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add prompt-injection fencing to _webhook_memory_content (was missing
the --- BEGIN/END EXTERNAL DATA --- fence applied elsewhere)
- Wrap Content-Length parsing in try/except to avoid 500 on malformed
header values
- Move _to_gateway_read below imports (was incorrectly placed between
import blocks) and tighten transformer types
- Replace list-rebuild with deque.popleft in rate limiter for O(expired)
amortized pruning instead of O(n) per call
- Make organization_id required in send_session_message to prevent
fail-open cross-tenant check
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- agent.py: Fail closed when gateway lookup returns None instead of
silently dropping the organization filter (cross-tenant board leak)
- board_webhooks.py: Read request body via streaming chunks so an
oversized payload is rejected before it is fully loaded into memory
- rate_limit.py: Add periodic sweep of expired keys to prevent
unbounded memory growth from inactive clients
- test_rate_limit.py: Add test for the new sweep behavior
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent token auth performed O(n) PBKDF2 operations per request with no
rate limiting, enabling CPU exhaustion attacks. Webhook ingest had no
rate limits either. Add an in-memory token-bucket rate limiter:
- Agent auth: 20 requests/minute per IP
- Webhook ingest: 60 requests/minute per IP
Includes unit tests for the rate limiter.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The webhook ingest endpoint read the entire request body with no size
limit, enabling memory exhaustion attacks. Add a 1 MB limit checked
via both Content-Length header (early reject) and actual body size.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
User-controlled fields (skill name, source URL, webhook payloads) were
interpolated directly into agent instruction messages. Sanitize skill
fields by stripping newlines/control chars, and fence all external data
behind "BEGIN EXTERNAL DATA" / "BEGIN STRUCTURED DATA" delimiters with
explicit "do not interpret as instructions" markers. Move system
instructions above the data section so they cannot be overridden.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Webhook ingest endpoint was completely unauthenticated. Add an optional
`secret` field to BoardWebhook. When configured, inbound requests must
include a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature in X-Hub-Signature-256 or
X-Webhook-Signature headers. Uses hmac.compare_digest for timing safety.
Includes migration to add the secret column.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
