fix(security): Close review follow-up gaps

Rate-limit the optional agent bearer path after user auth resolution so mixed user/agent routes no longer leave an unthrottled PBKDF2 path. Stop logging token prefixes on agent auth failures and require a locally supplied token for backend/.env.test instead of committing one.

Update tests and docs to cover agent bearer fallback, configurable webhook signature headers, and the operator-facing security settings added by the hardening work.

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>

backend/.env.test

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 # Commit-safe backend test environment.
 # Usage:
+#   export LOCAL_AUTH_TOKEN="$(python3 -c 'import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))')"
 #   cd backend
 #   uv run --env-file .env.test uvicorn app.main:app --reload --port 8000
 
@@ -17,9 +18,9 @@ BASE_URL=http://localhost:8000
 
 # Auth mode: local for test/dev
 AUTH_MODE=local
+# Set in your shell before starting the backend.
 # Must be non-placeholder and >= 50 chars.
-# Generate with: python3 -c "import secrets; print(secrets.token_urlsafe(48))"
+LOCAL_AUTH_TOKEN=
-LOCAL_AUTH_TOKEN=local-auth-test-token-aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
 
 # Clerk settings kept empty in local auth mode
 CLERK_SECRET_KEY=

backend/app/api/deps.py

@@ -22,9 +22,9 @@ from dataclasses import dataclass
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Literal
 from uuid import UUID
 
-from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, status
+from fastapi import Depends, HTTPException, Request, status
 
-from app.core.agent_auth import AgentAuthContext, get_agent_auth_context_optional
+from app.core.agent_auth import get_agent_auth_context_optional
 from app.core.auth import AuthContext, get_auth_context, get_auth_context_optional
 from app.db.session import get_session
 from app.models.boards import Board
@@ -46,8 +46,6 @@ if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from app.models.users import User
 
 AUTH_DEP = Depends(get_auth_context)
-AUTH_OPTIONAL_DEP = Depends(get_auth_context_optional)
-AGENT_AUTH_OPTIONAL_DEP = Depends(get_agent_auth_context_optional)
 SESSION_DEP = Depends(get_session)
 
 
@@ -66,14 +64,29 @@ class ActorContext:
     agent: Agent | None = None
 
 
-def require_user_or_agent(
+async def require_user_or_agent(
-    auth: AuthContext | None = AUTH_OPTIONAL_DEP,
+    request: Request,
-    agent_auth: AgentAuthContext | None = AGENT_AUTH_OPTIONAL_DEP,
+    session: AsyncSession = SESSION_DEP,
 ) -> ActorContext:
-    """Authorize either a human user or an authenticated agent."""
+    """Authorize either a human user or an authenticated agent.
+
+    User auth is resolved first so normal bearer-token user traffic does not
+    also trigger agent-token verification on mixed user/agent routes.
+    """
+    auth = await get_auth_context_optional(
+        request=request,
+        credentials=None,
+        session=session,
+    )
     if auth is not None:
         require_user_actor(auth)
         return ActorContext(actor_type="user", user=auth.user)
+    agent_auth = await get_agent_auth_context_optional(
+        request=request,
+        agent_token=request.headers.get("X-Agent-Token"),
+        authorization=request.headers.get("Authorization"),
+        session=session,
+    )
     if agent_auth is not None:
         return ActorContext(actor_type="agent", agent=agent_auth.agent)
     raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED)

backend/app/core/agent_auth.py

@@ -133,9 +133,8 @@ async def get_agent_auth_context(
     agent = await _find_agent_for_token(session, resolved)
     if agent is None:
         logger.warning(
-            "agent auth invalid token path=%s token_prefix=%s",
+            "agent auth invalid token path=%s",
             request.url.path,
-            resolved[:6],
         )
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED)
     await _touch_agent_presence(request, session, agent)
@@ -171,21 +170,17 @@ async def get_agent_auth_context_optional(
                 bool(authorization),
             )
         return None
-    # Rate-limit when an agent token header is presented to prevent brute-force
+    # Rate-limit any request that is actually attempting agent auth on the
-    # guessing via the optional auth path. Scoped to X-Agent-Token so that
+    # optional path. Shared user/agent dependencies resolve user auth first.
-    # normal user Authorization headers are not throttled.
+    client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
-    if agent_token:
+    if not await agent_auth_limiter.is_allowed(client_ip):
-        client_ip = get_client_ip(request)
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS)
-        if not await agent_auth_limiter.is_allowed(client_ip):
-            raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_429_TOO_MANY_REQUESTS)
     agent = await _find_agent_for_token(session, resolved)
     if agent is None:
-        if agent_token:
+        logger.warning(
-            logger.warning(
+            "agent auth optional invalid token path=%s",
-                "agent auth optional invalid token path=%s token_prefix=%s",
+            request.url.path,
-                request.url.path,
+        )
-                resolved[:6],
-            )
         return None
     await _touch_agent_presence(request, session, agent)
     return AgentAuthContext(actor_type="agent", agent=agent)

backend/tests/test_agent_auth_security.py

@@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
+# ruff: noqa: INP001, SLF001
+"""Regression tests for agent-auth security hardening."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from types import SimpleNamespace
+
+import pytest
+from fastapi import HTTPException
+
+from app.api import deps
+from app.core import agent_auth
+from app.core.auth import AuthContext
+
+
+class _RecordingLimiter:
+    def __init__(self) -> None:
+        self.keys: list[str] = []
+
+    async def is_allowed(self, key: str) -> bool:
+        self.keys.append(key)
+        return True
+
+
+async def _noop_touch(*_: object, **__: object) -> None:
+    return None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_optional_agent_auth_rate_limits_bearer_agent_token(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    limiter = _RecordingLimiter()
+    agent = SimpleNamespace(id="agent-1")
+    request = SimpleNamespace(
+        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer agent-secret"},
+        client=SimpleNamespace(host="203.0.113.10"),
+        url=SimpleNamespace(path="/api/v1/tasks/task-1"),
+        method="POST",
+    )
+
+    async def _fake_find(_session: object, token: str) -> object:
+        assert token == "agent-secret"
+        return agent
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "agent_auth_limiter", limiter)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "_find_agent_for_token", _fake_find)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "_touch_agent_presence", _noop_touch)
+
+    ctx = await agent_auth.get_agent_auth_context_optional(
+        request=request,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        agent_token=None,
+        authorization="Bearer agent-secret",
+        session=SimpleNamespace(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
+    assert ctx is not None
+    assert ctx.agent is agent
+    assert limiter.keys == ["203.0.113.10"]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_require_user_or_agent_skips_agent_auth_when_user_auth_succeeds(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    request = SimpleNamespace(
+        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer user-token"},
+        client=SimpleNamespace(host="203.0.113.20"),
+    )
+
+    async def _fake_user_auth(**_: object) -> AuthContext:
+        return AuthContext(actor_type="user", user=SimpleNamespace(id="user-1"))
+
+    async def _boom_agent_auth(**_: object) -> object:
+        raise AssertionError("agent auth should not run when user auth already succeeded")
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "get_auth_context_optional", _fake_user_auth)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(deps, "get_agent_auth_context_optional", _boom_agent_auth)
+
+    actor = await deps.require_user_or_agent(
+        request=request,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        session=SimpleNamespace(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
+    assert actor.actor_type == "user"
+    assert actor.user is not None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_required_agent_auth_invalid_token_logs_no_token_material(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    limiter = _RecordingLimiter()
+    logged: list[tuple[str, tuple[object, ...]]] = []
+    request = SimpleNamespace(
+        headers={"X-Agent-Token": "invalid-agent-token"},
+        client=SimpleNamespace(host="203.0.113.30"),
+        url=SimpleNamespace(path="/api/v1/agent/boards"),
+        method="POST",
+    )
+
+    async def _fake_find(_session: object, _token: str) -> None:
+        return None
+
+    def _fake_warning(message: str, *args: object, **_: object) -> None:
+        logged.append((message, args))
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "agent_auth_limiter", limiter)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "_find_agent_for_token", _fake_find)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth.logger, "warning", _fake_warning)
+
+    with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc_info:
+        await agent_auth.get_agent_auth_context(
+            request=request,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+            agent_token="invalid-agent-token",
+            authorization=None,
+            session=SimpleNamespace(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        )
+
+    assert exc_info.value.status_code == 401
+    assert logged == [("agent auth invalid token path=%s", ("/api/v1/agent/boards",))]
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_optional_agent_auth_invalid_token_logs_no_token_material(
+    monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+) -> None:
+    limiter = _RecordingLimiter()
+    logged: list[tuple[str, tuple[object, ...]]] = []
+    request = SimpleNamespace(
+        headers={"Authorization": "Bearer invalid-agent-token"},
+        client=SimpleNamespace(host="203.0.113.40"),
+        url=SimpleNamespace(path="/api/v1/tasks/task-2"),
+        method="POST",
+    )
+
+    async def _fake_find(_session: object, _token: str) -> None:
+        return None
+
+    def _fake_warning(message: str, *args: object, **_: object) -> None:
+        logged.append((message, args))
+
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "agent_auth_limiter", limiter)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth, "_find_agent_for_token", _fake_find)
+    monkeypatch.setattr(agent_auth.logger, "warning", _fake_warning)
+
+    ctx = await agent_auth.get_agent_auth_context_optional(
+        request=request,  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+        agent_token=None,
+        authorization="Bearer invalid-agent-token",
+        session=SimpleNamespace(),  # type: ignore[arg-type]
+    )
+
+    assert ctx is None
+    assert logged == [("agent auth optional invalid token path=%s", ("/api/v1/tasks/task-2",))]

backend/tests/test_config_auth_mode.py

@@ -101,8 +101,7 @@ def test_base_url_field_is_required(monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch) -> None:
         )
 
     text = str(exc_info.value)
-    assert "base_url" in text
+    assert "BASE_URL must be set and non-empty" in text
-    assert "Field required" in text
 
 
 @pytest.mark.parametrize(

backend/tests/test_security_fixes.py

@@ -309,6 +309,50 @@ class TestWebhookHmacVerification:
         finally:
             await engine.dispose()
 
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_webhook_accepts_configured_signature_header(
+        self,
+        monkeypatch: pytest.MonkeyPatch,
+    ) -> None:
+        """A configured signature_header should override the default header names."""
+        engine = await _make_engine()
+        session_maker = async_sessionmaker(engine, class_=AsyncSession, expire_on_commit=False)
+        app = _build_webhook_test_app(session_maker)
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(board_webhooks, "enqueue_webhook_delivery", lambda p: True)
+        monkeypatch.setattr(
+            board_webhooks,
+            "webhook_ingest_limiter",
+            InMemoryRateLimiter(max_requests=1000, window_seconds=60.0),
+        )
+
+        secret = "my-secret-key"
+        async with session_maker() as session:
+            board, webhook = await _seed_webhook_with_secret(session, secret=secret)
+            webhook.signature_header = "X-Custom-Signature"
+            session.add(webhook)
+            await session.commit()
+
+        body = b'{"event": "test"}'
+        sig = hmac_mod.new(secret.encode(), body, hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
+
+        try:
+            async with AsyncClient(
+                transport=ASGITransport(app=app),
+                base_url="http://testserver",
+            ) as client:
+                response = await client.post(
+                    f"/api/v1/boards/{board.id}/webhooks/{webhook.id}",
+                    content=body,
+                    headers={
+                        "Content-Type": "application/json",
+                        "X-Custom-Signature": f"sha256={sig}",
+                    },
+                )
+            assert response.status_code == 202
+        finally:
+            await engine.dispose()
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Task 10: Prompt injection sanitization
@@ -495,8 +539,3 @@ class TestWebhookPayloadSizeLimit:
             assert response.status_code == 413
         finally:
             await engine.dispose()
-
-
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Task 12: Gateway token redaction
-# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

docs/operations/README.md

@@ -107,13 +107,13 @@ When using the in-memory backend in multi-process deployments, also apply rate l
 
 ### Webhook signature errors (403)
 
-If a webhook has a `secret` configured, inbound payloads must include a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature in one of these headers:
+If a webhook has a `secret` configured, inbound payloads must include a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature. If the webhook also sets `signature_header`, that exact header name must be used. Otherwise the backend checks these defaults:
 
 - `X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hex-digest>` (GitHub-style)
 - `X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=<hex-digest>`
 
-Missing or invalid signatures return `403 Forbidden`. If you see unexpected 403s on webhook ingest, verify that the sending service is computing the HMAC correctly using the webhook's secret.
+Missing or invalid signatures return `403 Forbidden`. If you see unexpected 403s on webhook ingest, verify that the sending service is computing the HMAC correctly using the webhook's secret and sending it in the configured header.
 
 ### Webhook payload too large (413)
 
-Webhook ingest enforces a **1 MB** payload size limit. Payloads exceeding this return `413 Content Too Large`. If you need to send larger payloads, consider sending a URL reference instead of inline content.
+Webhook ingest enforces a **1 MB** payload size limit by default. Payloads exceeding this return `413 Content Too Large`. If you need to raise the limit, set `WEBHOOK_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES`; otherwise consider sending a URL reference instead of inline content.

docs/reference/api.md

@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ Some endpoints are designed for autonomous agents and use an agent token header:
 X-Agent-Token: <agent-token>
 ```
 
-In the backend, these are enforced via the “agent auth” context. When in doubt, consult the route’s dependencies (e.g., `require_user_or_agent`).
+On shared user/agent routes, the backend also accepts `Authorization: Bearer <agent-token>` after user auth does not resolve. When in doubt, consult the route’s dependencies (e.g., `require_user_or_agent`).
 
 Agent authentication is rate-limited to **20 requests per 60 seconds per IP**. Exceeding this limit returns `429 Too Many Requests`.
 
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ The following per-IP rate limits are enforced on sensitive endpoints:
 
 | Endpoint | Limit | Window |
 | --- | --- | --- |
-| Agent authentication (`X-Agent-Token`) | 20 requests | 60 seconds |
+| Agent authentication (`X-Agent-Token` or agent bearer fallback on shared routes) | 20 requests | 60 seconds |
 | Webhook ingest (`POST .../webhooks/{id}`) | 60 requests | 60 seconds |
 
 When a rate limit is exceeded, the API returns `429 Too Many Requests`.

docs/reference/authentication.md

@@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ Frontend:
 
 ## Agent authentication
 
-Autonomous agents authenticate via an `X-Agent-Token` header (not the bearer token used by human users). See [API reference](api.md) for details.
+Autonomous agents primarily authenticate via an `X-Agent-Token` header. On shared user/agent routes, the backend also accepts `Authorization: Bearer <agent-token>` after user auth does not resolve. See [API reference](api.md) for details.
 
 Security notes:
 
 - Agent auth is rate-limited to **20 requests per 60 seconds per IP**. Exceeding this returns `429 Too Many Requests`.
-- On authentication failure, only a short prefix of the presented token is logged to aid debugging. Full tokens are never written to logs.
+- Authentication failure logs never include token material.

docs/reference/configuration.md

@@ -18,6 +18,30 @@ See `.env.example` for defaults and required values.
 - **When required:** `AUTH_MODE=local`
 - **Policy:** Must be non-placeholder and at least 50 characters.
 
+### `WEBHOOK_MAX_PAYLOAD_BYTES`
+
+- **Default:** `1048576` (1 MiB)
+- **Purpose:** Maximum accepted inbound webhook payload size before the API returns `413 Content Too Large`.
+
+### `RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND`
+
+- **Default:** `memory`
+- **Allowed values:** `memory`, `redis`
+- **Purpose:** Selects whether rate limits are tracked per-process in memory or shared through Redis.
+
+### `RATE_LIMIT_REDIS_URL`
+
+- **Default:** _(blank)_
+- **When required:** `RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND=redis` and `RQ_REDIS_URL` is not set
+- **Purpose:** Redis connection string used for shared rate limits.
+- **Fallback:** If blank and Redis rate limiting is enabled, the backend falls back to `RQ_REDIS_URL`.
+
+### `TRUSTED_PROXIES`
+
+- **Default:** _(blank)_
+- **Purpose:** Comma-separated list of trusted reverse-proxy IPs or CIDRs used to honor `Forwarded` / `X-Forwarded-For` client IP headers.
+- **Gotcha:** Leave this blank unless the direct peer is a proxy you control.
+
 ## Security response headers
 
 These environment variables control security headers added to every API response. Set any variable to blank (`""`) to disable the corresponding header.

docs/reference/security.md

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ Per-IP rate limits are enforced on sensitive endpoints:
 
 | Endpoint | Limit | Window | Status on exceed |
 | --- | --- | --- | --- |
-| Agent authentication (`X-Agent-Token`) | 20 requests | 60 seconds | `429` |
+| Agent authentication (`X-Agent-Token` or agent bearer fallback on shared routes) | 20 requests | 60 seconds | `429` |
 | Webhook ingest (`POST .../webhooks/{id}`) | 60 requests | 60 seconds | `429` |
 
 Two backends are supported, selected via `RATE_LIMIT_BACKEND`:
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ The Redis backend fails open — if Redis becomes unreachable during a request,
 
 ## Webhook HMAC verification
 
-Webhooks may optionally have a `secret` configured. When a secret is set, inbound payloads must include a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature in one of these headers:
+Webhooks may optionally have a `secret` configured. When a secret is set, inbound payloads must include a valid HMAC-SHA256 signature. If `signature_header` is configured on the webhook, that exact header is required. Otherwise the backend falls back to these default headers:
 
 - `X-Hub-Signature-256: sha256=<hex-digest>` (GitHub-style)
 - `X-Webhook-Signature: sha256=<hex-digest>`
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ This boundary helps LLM-based agents distinguish trusted instructions from untru
 
 ## Agent token logging
 
-On authentication failure, only a short prefix of the presented token is logged to aid debugging. Full tokens are never written to logs.
+On authentication failure, logs include request context only. Token values and token prefixes are not written to logs.
 
 ## Cross-tenant isolation