security: fix fail-open auth, streaming payload limit, and rate limiter memory leak

- agent.py: Fail closed when gateway lookup returns None instead of
  silently dropping the organization filter (cross-tenant board leak)
- board_webhooks.py: Read request body via streaming chunks so an
  oversized payload is rejected before it is fully loaded into memory
- rate_limit.py: Add periodic sweep of expired keys to prevent
  unbounded memory growth from inactive clients
- test_rate_limit.py: Add test for the new sweep behavior

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

backend/app/api/agent.py

@@ -373,10 +373,14 @@ async def list_boards(
         # Main agents (board_id=None) must be scoped to their organization
         # via their gateway to prevent cross-tenant board leakage.
         gateway = await Gateway.objects.by_id(agent_ctx.agent.gateway_id).first(session)
-        if gateway is not None:
-            statement = statement.where(
-                col(Board.organization_id) == gateway.organization_id,
+        if gateway is None:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN,
+                detail="Agent gateway not found; cannot determine organization scope.",
             )
+        statement = statement.where(
+            col(Board.organization_id) == gateway.organization_id,
+        )
     statement = statement.order_by(col(Board.created_at).desc())
     return await paginate(session, statement)
 

backend/app/api/board_webhooks.py

@@ -501,6 +501,8 @@ async def ingest_board_webhook(
         )
 
     # Enforce a 1 MB payload size limit to prevent memory exhaustion.
+    # Read the body in chunks via request.stream() so an attacker cannot
+    # cause OOM by sending a huge body with a missing/spoofed Content-Length.
     max_payload_bytes = 1_048_576
     content_length = request.headers.get("content-length")
     if content_length and int(content_length) > max_payload_bytes:
@@ -508,12 +510,17 @@ async def ingest_board_webhook(
             status_code=status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
             detail=f"Payload exceeds maximum size of {max_payload_bytes} bytes.",
         )
-    raw_body = await request.body()
-    if len(raw_body) > max_payload_bytes:
-        raise HTTPException(
-            status_code=status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
-            detail=f"Payload exceeds maximum size of {max_payload_bytes} bytes.",
-        )
+    chunks: list[bytes] = []
+    total_size = 0
+    async for chunk in request.stream():
+        total_size += len(chunk)
+        if total_size > max_payload_bytes:
+            raise HTTPException(
+                status_code=status.HTTP_413_CONTENT_TOO_LARGE,
+                detail=f"Payload exceeds maximum size of {max_payload_bytes} bytes.",
+            )
+        chunks.append(chunk)
+    raw_body = b"".join(chunks)
     _verify_webhook_signature(webhook, raw_body, request)
 
     content_type = request.headers.get("content-type")